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REVIEWS
MILITARY JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL. By S. Sidney Ulmer.
Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970. Pp.
115. $6.50
In 1968 North Korean patrol boats summarily seized the U.S.
Navy intelligence ship Pueblo off the North Korean coast. The highly
publicized Court of Inquiry, convened after the release of Pueblo Com-
mander Lloyd M. Bucher and his crew, becomes the launching pad for
Professor Ulmer's thoughtful study of
[T]he development of American Military justice in the con-
text of military prosecutions and the interplay of politics and the
public with that development.1
It is Professor Ulmer's premise that the American public has long been
interested in the rights of servicemen prosecuted for alleged irregulari-
ties, and that this interest has never been higher than it is now. Even
school children know that My Lai is a tiny Vietnamese hamlet and
that one Lt. William L. Calley was convicted of killing 22 civilians
there. The trials of Calley's superiors, Capt. Ernest L. Medina and Col.
Oran K. Henderson, further fire public interest in, and comment on,
military justice. Because civilian courts usually cannot grant military
prisoners relief until all available remedies within the military system
are exhausted, 2 military justice should be of no small interest to us.
Professor Ulmer's analysis of the rights of the accused is thus most
timely and appropriate for our leisurely reading.
After tracing some parallels between civilian and military justice,
and noting that civilian interest in military justice substantially in-
creases during wartime, the book moves from the abstract to the con-
crete and considers, specifically, the right to counsel in criminal military
prosecutions. The primary burden undertaken by Professor Ulmer is a
thorough chronological dissertation on the serviceman's right to coun-
sel, beginning with a 1731 South Carolina statute, and ending with
a 1969 federal statute extending the right to counsel for bad conduct
discharges. Opinions of the Court of Military Appeals, as well as Su-
preme Court cases, are discussed. Behavior of defense counsel and
adequacy are both treated to some extent. The book is historically
expository rather than argumentative, but the disparities shown be-
tween the military and civilian systems indicate that it is Professor
1 S. ULum, MILITARY JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 12 (1970).
2 Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969).
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Ulmer's position that the rights of the civilian accused are more sub-
stantial than those of the military accused.
Occasionally the military accused has some procedural advantages
over his civilian counterpart. Gideon v. Wainwright3 and its progeny
settle the civilian issue of the indigent's right to counsel under the
sixth amendment. In general and special courts-martial, lawyer-counsel
is provided free even if the accused could afford to pay,4 whereas the
civilian accused must first qualify as an indigent to be eligible for free
legal assistance.5 At a summary courts-martial the accused is exposed to
possible confinement for a month or less, but it is not required that he
be represented by counsel. He can, however, refuse summary courts-
martial and thereby effectively demand special courts-martial, thus ob-
taining counsel."
Professor Ulmer's observation that liberalization of military law
correlates with the use of large numbers of citizen draftees is con-
clusively proven in his book. It would seem that a President and Con-
gress burdened with an almost universally unpopular Viet Nam war
will further relax the rules under which the military is tried. With
the recent discharge of two Marine Corps officers as conscientious
objectors, one wonders about the extent to which the armed forces
will go in assuring the constitutional rights of its constituents.7 If an
all-voluntary armed force is desirable, then it would appear that fact-
finding procedures in military trials will have to be much more com-
parable to those found in civilian life. A tactical retreat must be made
from the long-held position of the military establishment, that military
justice must be swift and certain, and must be military-administered.
In the words of Professor Ulmer:
[T]he draftee is more likely to aspire to the principles and pro-
cedures of the larger society and its legal system than the profes-
sional military man who may subjugate such values to military
expediency.8
3 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (1964). Sentences of more than
6 months confinement can be meted out only at General Courts-Martial, 10 U.S.C. § 818,
819 (1964).
5 Before the Military Justice Act of 1968, the serviceman's right to counsel before mili-
tary tribunals was anything but exemplary. See Sherman, The Right to Counsel in Special
Courts-Martial, 54 A.B.A.J. 866 (1968); see also Gibbs v. Blackwell, 354 F.2d 469 (5th Cir.
1965); Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (C.D. Utah 1965), noted in 2 CAL. W. L.
REv. 121 (1966); Christensen, Pretrial Right to Counsel, 23 MirrARY L. REv. 1 (1964).
6 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964). For an interesting defense
of the adequacy of military rights, see Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused:
Advantages over a Civilian Defendant, 51 MILrrARY L. Rav. 1 (1971).
7 See Curtis, Due Process and Military Dicharges, 57 A.B.A.J. 875 (1971).
8 S. ULuERa, supra note 1, at 107.
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The book carefully distinguishes between the two dimensions of
the right to counsel problem. The question of who has the right to
counsel can be separated from the issue of qualifications of counsel. It
is here that the book must be brought up to date, as it was apparently
written prior to the Military Justice Act of 19689 Professor Ulmer's
discussion is predicated on the old law, under which the accused could
be tried before a special court-martial without a lawyer-counsel. Since
October, 1968, the trial or defense counsel in both general and special
courts-martial must be a judge advocate, a law school graduate, or a
bar member, and must be certified as competent to perform trial duties
by the Judge Advocate General.' 0 Professor Ulmer correctly predicted
that the former discrepancy between civilian and military courts would
be eliminated." Incidentally, the requirement of certification of com-
petence of trial and defense counsel could well be emulated by civilian
courts. All too frequently, opposing advocates in civilian trials are
grossly mismatched.
Professor Ulmer suggests that in the period 1951-1967, the United
States Court of Military Appeals placed greater emphasis on the be-
havior of counsel during trial than had the Supreme Court. The Ameri-
can public has since witnessed spectacularly outrageous behavior by
defense attorneys in certain highly publicized trials, the likes of which
would hardly be tolerated by any military tribunal. Of course, the
cases to which Professor Ulmer refers deal with errors in legal judg-
ment rather than deliberate attempts to thwart the judicial process,
but it must be expected that obstructive tactics may also find their
way into military trials. Counsel who are members of the armed forces
may be hestitant to obstruct for the sake of mere obstruction, but the
military court's disciplinary powers over civilian attorneys might not
be wholly adequate. We have fortunately seen only the highest degree
of professional integrity and responsibility in the recent My Lai trials.
CONCLUSION
It must be conceded that the few hours needed to read Professor
Ulmer's interesting work will be well worth the time. He may not
write for the critical lawyer-technician or for the military lawyer, but
he does write for the layman and for the general practitioner interested
in comparing military justice with that found outside the armed ser-
vices. For the student who requires a concise summary of the historical
9 Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335.
10 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 827(b), (c) (1964).
11 S. ULMER, 110.
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background of our present system of military justice, the book is a
must. The style is fluid and the train of thought is readily compre-
hensible. Professor Ulmer is never impenetrable or inane, nor does
he attempt a task which is inexecutable within the chosen length of
his work. On the contrary, the book should be a part of the military
justice collection of every law school and county law library.
The military establishments of the world have achieved political
power inconceivable before World War II. It is fitting that scholarly
work be addressed to the scope of that power and its consequences. In
the words of a former Chief Justice of the United States:
Determining the proper role to be assigned to the military in a
democratic society has been a troublesome problem for every na-
tion that has aspired to a free political life. The military establish-
ment is, of course, a necessary organ of government; but the reach
of its power must be carefully limited lest the delicate balance
between freedom and order be upset. The maintenance of the
balance is made more difficult by the fact that while the military
serves the vital function of preserving the existence of the nation,
it is, at the same time, the one element of government that exercises
a type of authority not easily assimilated in a free society.12
Ramon A. Klitzke*
12 Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 87 N.Y.U.L. REV. 181 (1962).
* Assodate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
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